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Commentaries & Replies
On "Predicting Future War"
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This commentary is in response to Robert A. Johnson's article "Predicting Future War"
published in the Spring 2014 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 1).

The Joint Force Must Get Better at Understanding Combinations, Employing
Asymmetry, Evaluating Risk

T

he article “Predicting Future War” by Robert Johnson provides
a compelling vision for the types of challenges future forces will
face and the military implications of those challenges. Although
“tours of the future” like those found in the article are important, I
believe it is critical the military step back and understand the cultural
reflexes and biases we must cultivate order to address those emerging
challenges. Straight-line analysis of trends and their implications may
drive us to solutions that are wrong or incomplete. Instead, I would
advocate a broader view so the force as a whole can come to terms with
these challenges in a coherent way.
Strategic competition is always a back-and-forth affair. The US
approach to warfare over the last several decades has deeply impressed
potential adversaries and is encouraging speedy military innovation
around the world. This innovation is confronting the Joint Force with
an array of emerging military challenges and threatening to obsolesce,
or make irrelevant, parts of the US defense establishment. From antiaccess challenges in the Pacific, to “masked warfare” in Eastern Europe,
to evolving irregular and insurgent challenges throughout the Middle
East, adversaries are adapting to the “US way of war” and testing new
approaches to limiting American influence and reach.
Although always difficult in a bureaucracy as large and complex as
the Department of Defense, we have to think hard about building a
Joint Force (through conscious design) with keen appreciation for evolving strategic challenges and threats. The Chairman notes 80 percent of
the Joint Force of 2020 is essentially decided. Thus, what we do about
the remaining 20 percent can potentially have disproportional impact
on the success or failure of our future military. Perhaps even more
critical is what we do in doctrine, education, organization, training, and
leadership – in essence, the mental and social “software” that orients
and orchestrates our military capabilities. To get this software right, the
military should be thinking more deeply about the nature of these key
mental investments to ensure military change is positive, opportunistic,
and occurs on our terms, not an adversary’s. Coding this mental software also suggests now is the time to step back from individual weapons
or programs and think more broadly about the context within which
future conflict will take place. I see this contextual discussion taking
three distinct, yet related paths.
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First, we must work to understand better the complex threats and
challenges driving military change. Calling it complex is not good
enough; we must clarify this complexity if we do not want to miss the
mark. For me, this complexity is about combinations. Today, we face
novel combinations of threats from an array of adversaries. These
threats frequently transcend neat or tidy categories, cutting across land,
sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum, while
being distributed or reaching across broader geographic ranges. Each
military service tends to have a well-defined range of responsibilities in
which its competence and professionalism are unrivalled. Adversaries,
unable to confront superior capabilities within service domains, are
experimenting with combinations of overlapping capabilities capable of
cutting across seams or boundaries between services, or avoid them
altogether.
Second, these novel combinations of challenges, threats, and adversaries require novel combinations of power in response. To encourage
a future military capable of such combinations, we have to think about
the assembly and employment of complementary mixes of government,
civilian, and military power, which are at once confounding, irresistible,
surprising, and unexpected, to our adversaries. If we do this well, it
will set the stage for affordable and numerous new capabilities, such
as small, swarming robotics capable of taking advantage of the emerging intersection of twenty-first century engineering, manufacturing,
and information technologies. Furthermore, this mental approach will
assist in mitigating the vulnerabilities of our own expensive or hard-toreplace capital assets and overcome the potential limitations of a force
too exquisite to risk using. Before a war, a convincingly flexible force will
serve to deter more effectively. During war, it will be central to victory.
Third, we must better understand how to evaluate and mitigate risk
by integrating vulnerability assessments more comprehensively into all
aspects of our thinking. Risk is inherent every time military power is
employed. However, we often forget the true measure of power in the
international system is the ability to change the behavior of another at
reasonable cost. Critically, we need to get better at uncovering flaws in
our initial assumptions about military problems, and at articulating the
consequences of specific military actions or approaches. Not all problems are dangerous, not all dangers are pressing, not all emergencies
are soluble, and not all solutions are affordable. The defense intellectual
must understand how the US military is able, under modern warfighting
conditions, to provide political leaders flexible military options capable
of uniting strategy and tactics in a world of limitations. In a world characterized by powerful adversaries and perhaps less ample US military
capabilities, it is critical we cultivate a sense of risk management across
the future force.
Our institutional inability to think thorough contextual issues,
such as those I have described above, tends to discount future costs.
We default to easy decisions, such as protecting legacy structure, end
strength, or top-line budget, and put off difficult choices until they are
beyond the point at which they can be optimally solved. The great strategic thinker Colin Gray is well known for articulating the idea that war
is about context. Putting contextual discussions at the beginning of our
future force development activities will help to position the Department
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of Defense and the nation as a whole to seize opportunities rather than
– as is so often the case – be driven by institutional inertia or by reacting
to a more visionary, forward-looking adversary’s plans.
Dr. Johnson’s article surfaces a number of challenges the future
force will face, some will be right, some will be wrong. Critically,
however, I suggest we must understand how − in a world most agree is
(as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is fond of saying) “complex,
uncertain, and increasingly dangerous,” we cultivate the mental agility
to prepare where we can, and adjust to unanticipated conditions when
we must.

The Author Replies
Robert A. Johnson

M

r. Jeff Becker advances ideas that are close to my own and
I do not detect any fundamental disagreement between us,
but rather an injunction to develop our responses to future
trends. We share a critical view of the term “complex,” which Mr. Becker
rightly points out is overused. His observation that it is merely a question
of combination, perhaps in unexpected ways, is spot on. He encourages action “across the seams or boundaries between Services’’; our own
“novel combinations’’ and the cultivation of “mental agility.’’ In this we
are on the same page. Mr. Becker urges the armed services to: “better
understand the cultural reflexes and biases we must cultivate,” but I would
only caution here we also might better understand our usual reflexes in
order to militate against our tendency to reach the wrong conclusions. I
am also a little uncertain if we always get the formula for assessing risk
right. Risk is an inevitable facet of war and cannot be avoided, but he
rightly enjoins us to assess cost, which, in fact, is a far better metric. Mr.
Becker correctly deduces that to get our mental “software” right, “the
military should be thinking more deeply about the nature of these key
mental investments to ensure military change is positive, opportunistic,
and occurs on our terms, not an adversary’s.’’ In this, he is absolutely
right.

